Major Crime Investigation Policy (MCIP)
- Policy title:
- Major Crime Investigation Policy (MCIP)
This policy defines what a major crime is and details how an investigation is managed throughout the entire enquiry process from the initial report of a major crime to its conclusion.
1.1 This policy is required in order to provide comprehensive
guidance and direction to investigators, particularly Senior
Investigating Officers (SIOs), when an offence that falls within
the remit of a major crime investigation is identified or
1.2 It adheres to current and relevant legislation and guidance
manuals approved by the Association of Chief Police Officers
2.1 This policy is effective immediately and applies to Police
Officers and Police Staff.
3.1 The purpose of this policy is to provide guidance and
direction on all aspects of a major crime enquiry to ensure a
consistent and methodical approach with the aim of securing a
positive conclusion to the case.
4.1 This policy and associated appendices provide comprehensive
guidance on each type of major crime and how they should be
investigated and managed throughout the enquiry.
5 Policy Statement
5.1 Sussex Police are committed to ensuring that major crime is
investigated effectively, efficiently and to the highest
professional standard in order to bring the case to a prompt and
• 6.1 Ensures all major crime is investigated to the same
professional standard resulting in sound evidence to produce before
• Promotes public confidence in the police service
• 7.1 The Force Crime and Justice Department (FC & JD)
own this policy and are responsible for its review.
• Detective Supterintendant Major Crime Team is responsible
for ensuring the policy contents adhere to current legislation.
1 Definition of a Major Crime
1.1 Major crime is:
• Any homicide including murder, manslaughter and corporate
• Any other major crime where the effectiveness of the
police investigation is likely to have a significant impact on the
confidence of the victim, their family and/or community AND is
beyond the capability of a Divisional Command Unit (DCU).
• Any crime designated a major crime by the Head of the
Major Crime Team, Head of FC & JD or by Assistant Chief
Constable (ACC) Joint Command - in so designating such a crime,
consideration will ,in particular, be given to the potential of the
crime to generate grave public concern at
• Crimes in action including offences of kidnap and
2.1 All major crime investigations Will be conducted under the
guidance and direction of the following documents:
• Murder Investigation Manual (MIM)
• Major Incident Room Standardised Administrative Protocol
• ACPO Kidnap Manual
• National Specialist Law Enforcement Centre (NSLEC)- The
management of kidnap and extortion for senior investigating
• ACPO National Road Death Investigation Manual.
3 Senior Investigating Officers (SIO)
3.1 The SIOs are those Officers designated as such within the
Major Crime Team (MCT) of the FC & JD and are listed on the,
SIO Call Out Schedule. These SIOs are designated as such by
the Detective Superintendent in the MCT in conjunction with
Head of FC & JD.
3.2 The Force SIOs are the following post holders:
• Detective Superintendent - MCT
• Detective Chief Inspector x 4 - MCT
3.3 SIOs can also be selected from the following post holders as
decided by the Head of MCT and/or Head of FC & JD.
• Detective Superintendent - Protecting Vulnerable
People (PVP) Branch
• Detective Chief Inspector - PVP
• Detective Chief Inspector - Operations/Intelligence
4 Major Crime Team
4.1 The standard operating hours of MCT will be 7 days a week
from 0900 - 1700
A Senior Investigating Officer and his staff will be available for
deployment 24 hours a day, 7 days a week on a call-out basis. The
call out team consists of the following
• 1 x Detective Inspector
• 1 x Detective Sergeant
• 4 x Detective Constable
This is the minimum number of staff that will be deployed to an
4.2 The on call SIO will make contact within 15 minutes of
receiving a call and, if appropriate, will attend the scene of a
suspicious death or major crime, at any location in the county, as
soon as practicable but in any case within 2 hours.
4.3 The on call MCT and, where appropriate, the Home Office
Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES) support will be deployed at the
discretion of the SIO. Additional resources from MCT may be
deployed if required.
4.4 Additional staff from the Division will be provided to
investigate, following consultation between the SIO and the
Divisional Crime Manager. In any case Divisions are expected to
provide the following:
• An Intelligence Officer
• PIP Level II accredited investigators for Outside
• Divisional DI/DS as deemed appropriate by SIO
4.5 Divisional Crime Managers should ensure that the staff they
supply to fulfil the identified roles within a Major Incident Room
(MIR) must be trained to HOLMES II standard.
4.6 Any Callout of a Home Office Pathologist must be authorised
by an SIO prior to contact being made.
5 Use of Holmes
5.1 It is imperative that in all instances when an SIO grades a
major crime as a grade A or B crime, then a HOLMES major incident
room will be setup. In cases when a major crime is graded as a C
crime, then a HOLMES led room will be set up wherever possible. Any
decision not to use HOLMES must be recorded by the SIO in their
6.1 All major crimes will be subject to a formal review process
in accordance with the Sussex Police major crime review
7 Staff Associations
7.1 Consideration should be given by the SIO to liaising with
staff associations, where appropriate, as they have been shown as
an effective resource in previous investigations. They are
able to provide a unique perspective, having knowledge of both
communities and how the police service works.
8 File Storage
8.1 At the conclusion of any subsequent 'Major Crime' criminal
trial, the file, along with all exhibits, will be archived in a
purpose built store at Sussex House. This should only be actioned
at the point when all appeals and enquires are complete. This
will be done in accordance with the Criminal Procedures and
Investigation Act (CPIA) 1996 and the ACPO Guidance on the
Management of Police Information. (MoPI).
8.2 In the event that an investigation remains as undetected,
the file and all of the evidence gathered to date will also be
retained within the archive store.
8.3 All relevant forensic exhibits will be retained and
preserved in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding agreed
between the Forensic Science Service (FSS) and ACPO.
9 Closing Report
9.1 A closing report will be compiled by the Deputy SIO/Office
Manager at the completion of the investigation. This document
should contain the following information:
• Summary of case/Background of Suspect/Summary of
• Key Staff - SIO/Deputy SIO/OIC/Office
Manager/Family Liaison Officer (FLO)/Exhibits Officer/Disclosure
Officer/Senior Scenes of Crime Officer (SOCO)/CPS Rep/Prosecution
• Use of Holmes
• Investigative Issues
• Crime No/Lab Refernce No/SOCO Reference No/Crown Court
9.2 Once complete, the original report will remain with the file
papers. Copies will be e-mailed to the Management Secretary -
Major Crime Team, Divisional Commander and Divisional Crime Manager
for the area concerned.
10 Procedural Appendices
10.1 The appendices associated with this policy bring together
all of the various strands of major crime investigation in national
and local guidance. They are listed below for ease of
• ACPO Policy Document - 'Death Abroad'
• Community Impact Assessment
• Deaths on land owned by Ministry of Defence
• Dissemination of Intelligence onto CIMS - Major Crime
• Independent Advisory Group (IAG)
• Intelligence Cells for Major Crime
• NCPE - Investigating Serious Sexual Assault
• Investigating Deaths involving Police contact
• NCPE - Journal of Homicide and Major Incident Investigation
Volume 1 Issue 1 (2005)
• Major Crime Review Procedures
• NHS / ACPO - Memorandum of Understanding.
• Organ Transplant Protocol
• Prison, Probation, Immigration, Deaths in custody
• Unexplained Child Death
• Unexplained Death
• Work related Death
ACPO Policy Document - 'Death Abroad'
Deaths on Land owned by MOD
Investigating Serious Sexual Offences
Investigation Of Deaths Following Police
Investigation Of Deaths Following Police
Major Crime Review Procedures
NHS Investigating Patient Safety - Memorandum of
Prison, Probation And Immigration Related Deaths In
Unexplained Child Death
For a copy of the above appendices please apply to the
Sussex Police Force Policy Officer
Community Impact Assessments
1.1 The Community Impact Assessment (CIA) document is the
responsibility the local Divisional Commander, with support from
SIO. They will ensure that the CIA is fully articulated according
to the local need. The SIO will need to be aware that the CIA may
need to cover more than one Divisional area.
1.2 If the CIA has a potential for force wide considerations,
then the ACC may also have a view on the content.
1.3 A CIA will always be considered in all cases of homicide and
other major crime incidents. When a major crime investigation is
conducted, its impact on the immediate community or minority groups
may be considerable. The object of such an assessment is to
objectively analyse any factors that may impact upon community
1.4 No method can accurately predict the tensions that may arise
within a community or an individual group during a major
investigation. The SIO, however, must always remain analytical,
objective and independent, irrespective of any community, cultural
or other factors being considered.
1.5 The fundamental principles and considerations for the SIO
are as follows:-
• It is incumbent on the police service to acknowledge the
impact that any major investigation, particularly homicide, may
have upon local communities and minority groups.
• The identification and assessment of any impact lies with the
police service, generally in collaboration with external agencies.
The primary responsibility is that of the local Divisional
Commander and/or the most senior Uniformed Officer with direct
knowledge and responsibility of the area.
• It is paramount that the CIA is considered early, particularly
with certain communities. The ACPO Homicide Working Group recommend
the, "initial assessment" should be made within four hours of the
discovery of the major crime.
• The SIO will include the CIA as a standing item on the SIO's
management team agenda.
• The police service has a primary responsibility to
successfully manage any impact a homicide or major investigation
has upon the local community.
• It is important that the concerns of the family of the
deceased are adequately and sensitively addressed as they may
represent a valuable mediating influence within the community.
1.6 It is always advisable that any impact upon a community or
minority group should be considered and discussed with us in the
public arena. It is essential that the management of an impact
statement should be ethical and transparent and whilst the
responsibility of actioning it, is that of the SIO, the divisional
commander will take the lead in liaison with the SIO and/or the ACC
1.7 It is crucial that the impact assessment is based on
evidence and intelligence, is objective and capable of withstanding
1.8 The MIRSAP manual defines the need to include intelligence
within the impact statement, outlines inter-agency exchange, media
effectiveness and disclosure. The MIRSAP manual has recommended an
impact assessment document along with detailed instructions as to
how to complete the various forms as well as the community impact
1.9 The CIA Aide Memoire should include;-
• Is the Offence racially motivated?
• Is the victim or suspect from a minority group (or likely to
• Is the victim a child or vulnerable person?
• What is the reaction of the local community?
• Are there any other factors that will influence the
• What is the overall risk assessment?
• Is there any on-going Police activity that requires a
2 POLICY FILE
2.1 The CIA should only be considered if it is necessary;
otherwise there will be a danger in undervaluing the process. In
these circumstances the Policy File will always be endorsed "that a
CIA was considered but the view reached was that it was not
required." A Policy File entry will always be completed by the SIO
detailing the fact that the CIA has been made with the relevant
Divisional Commander and that all associated documents are now held
by the Divisional Commander. The CIA will be continually
2.2 The ACPO Homicide Working Group has also made a number of
recommendations that are included in this section.
2.3 Sussex Police practice will accord with the chapters on
community impact assessments both within the MIM, the MIRSAP manual
and the ACPO Homicide Working Group.
2.4 The SIO must record in the Policy File, that an Impact
Assessment Document has been considered/completed. The Policy File
and the relevant page number must be entered into the Impact
Assessment Document for reference purposes.
Dissemination of Intelligence onto CIMS - Major Crime
• At Briefing SIO / Deputy SIO to remind all Officers on
enquiry of the need to submit Intelligence reports.
• Intelligence Cell responsible for the submission of any
intelligence they gather during an enquiry on to CIMS.
• Outside Enquiry Team members responsible for submitting
any intelligence they gather during an enquiry to CIMS.
• Before speaking to a witness or conducting a T/I
enquiry the officer should, as a matter of routine, be conducting
CIMS and OIS checks on the address and the subject. SIO will
set level of checks required in conjunction with Intelligence
Manager as part of SIR.
• If it is clear that the subject has a nominal record
officers should include the nominal CIMS URN or mark 'No trace' in
order that a nominal record can be created. Officer can 'cut and
paste' from their Officers Report onto a 5x5x5 document but need to
sanitise the information with a view to afford the source of the
• Officer will then submit Officers Report into the MIR in
normal fashion with a written confirmation on the action that an
intelligence report has been submitted. Where Possible CIMS
reference number to be included on this report.
• No requirement for CIMS report to be placed into MIR.
(Unless Report contains additional material to their Officer's
Report which may be subject of CPIA disclosure rules)
• The intelligence report will then be dealt with by the
Source co-ordinator for that particular Division or depending on
the nature of the enquiry, CTIU or FIB.
• Intel Manager to ensure that Source Co-ordinator is aware
that Officers attached to the enquiry will be submitting
intelligence reports. Reporting Officer to add Operational Name to
Provenance Field on report. (To negate the issue of
intelligence being fed back into the enquiry appearing to
come from a separate source.)
• If the information directly affects the investigation the
SIO or their deputy can review with the Intelligence Manager and
decide to withhold the information until after the investigation
has finished or until any potential risk has been averted.
• Dip checks should by made by either the office manager or
the intelligence manager to review the quality of the intelligence
• Intelligence Manager to supply details of numbers
of reports submitted.
It is the responsibility of the Officer obtaining
the Intelligence to ensure its timely and accurate submission to
the Force Intelligence Database.
Independent Advisory Group (IAG)
Abstract: The purpose of the IAG is to build
relationships between the investigative team, the local community
and the victims' family
1.1 In Britain as a result of the MacPherson inquiry into the
investigation of the death of Stephen Lawrence, every individual
and institution has the responsibility to continually examine his
or her behaviour, perceptions and prejudices.
1.2 The principle of Independent Involvement and advice was
developed as part of the work undertaken by the Metropolitan Police
Independent involvement is the process that takes place when
people independent of the police service monitor, observe or
participate in any police activity in such a way that they have no
responsibility for the outcomes, but are free to make observations
both within the service and to the broader community. For maximum
benefit to the community and the service, such people will be drawn
from those who are;
• Able and prepared to critically appraise police policies and
• Representative of, or understand the issues of, the
• Able to make dispassionate assessment of what they
• Committed to improving community - police relations
• Those who can bring relevant expertise.
1.3 The advice of Independent Advisors is independent of the
police and carries no responsibility or liability for the outcome
and equally, the police are not obliged to follow any of the advice
1.4 Independent Advisors are separate from traditional community
advisors and should ideally have no connection with the judicial
processes and National or Local politics.
1.5 Experience of Forces has shown the benefits of independent
advice in current and historic investigations.
1.6 Individual Forces may currently have guidance, policy and
procedures covering the deployment if required of independent
advisors and as such the following is provided as advice/guidance
to officers performing the role of Gold command, Senior
Investigating Officer and/or Investigating Officer.
1.7 The decision to involve independent advisors in a specific
investigation is a decision for Gold Command, SIOs or lOs.
2 Operating Protocols
2.1 The operating protocols for independent advisors will depend
upon the requirements of the Force seeking the involvement of
2.2 As advisors are entirely independent of the Police Service
serious consideration must be given before they are used in cases
involving covert policing. However the responsibility to
investigate and manage the investigation lies with the SlO, and as
such he/she may wish to involve independent advisors documenting
the rationale for partial disclosure of certain lines of
2.3 It is recommended the S.I.O. should record in the policy book
the involvement and the extent of the involvement of Independent
2.4 The following are suggested areas to be addressed when
preparing an operating protocol;
Any disclosures made in the course of Independent Involvement
are subject to the strictest confidentiality and rules of
Determine a permanent chair for the group (independent - to be
identified by the group).
If a member of the police organisation is involved, agree how
this person will liaise and inform the chair/director of the
Independent Advisors and police must agree a process for
external communication and it is advised that a press statement be
released about the formation and terms of reference for the group
as soon as practicable. (If deemed appropriate)
Audio records of meetings (if equipment available) to ensure
accuracy of records in cases of disagreement and also to enable
reports or minutes to contain brief summaries, decisions, actions,
advice or recommendations only.
Any advice or recommendations made to the S.I.O/Investigating
Officer should be clearly and fully recorded in the minutes, and a
formal written acknowledgement should be returned by Police within
an agreed time, and if appropriate outlining how the matter will be
dealt with and when.
The Director, through the Police Co-coordinator (who will be
part of the group), will negotiate with the Independent Advisors an
agreement on reasonable expenses. (The Director being of Chief
Officer Rank (ACC) responsible for the process).
S.I.O / Investigating Officers should make every effort to
involve their Independent Advisory Group in all aspects of the
case, including the disclosure of information necessary for
effective advice and recommendations. The Advisory Group process
must be ethical and be seen to be so.
This ethical protocol should go some way to ensure the Advisory
Group meets the rigorous standards in public life expected and acts
as a guide to members in their work as Independent Advisors.
If the Independent Advisory Group is reviewing an incident which
has relevance to a member's interest, the member shall make this
known immediately to the meeting and the fact recorded in the
Minutes or Report of a meeting. A member's interests can include a
pecuniary interest, a pecuniary interest of a member of his/her
family or close friend/s and any matter where the member's position
on the Independent Advisory Group could be seen as possibly
influencing a decision the effect of which would be of benefit to
the member or members of his/her family or close friend/s. The
member shall not take part in any discussions in which the member
has declared an interest and shall leave the room during that
discussion, if so requested by the Chairperson. Consideration
should be given to that member not being party to any further
discussions or involvement in that particular case.
If such a declaration is made the meeting will determine to what
extent that member continues to participate in discussions about
the relevant subject (a member with such relevant interests shall
not be entitled to vote on formal advice or recommendations to the
Under no circumstances is a member to use his/her position as an
Independent Advisor to further or advantage his/her own interests.
Any serious and deliberate contravention of the above will call
into questioning the member's suitability to remain an Independent
Members should agree to the vetting procedures. - i.e. CR0 ,PNC,
Local Checks (However any positive results will not necessarily
mean exclusion from joining or continuing working on the
Members of the Independent Advisory Group should become
signatories to agree protocols accepting the need for total
confidentiality throughout and after this process have taken place,
except for those matters that have come into the public domain.
3 Terms of Reference
3.1 It is recommended a Terms of Reference be drawn up and
agreed by the SlO / Investigating Officer and the Independent
Advisors prior to the actual involvement of the Advisor/s.
3.2 The following are suggested areas, which should be
considered for inclusion in a Terms of Reference Document.
• The reason why it is thought appropriate for the involvement
of an Advisor or Advisory Group
• To advice and make recommendations to the SIO/Investigating
• To assist in reviewing and improving the investigation.
• To receive updates on investigations assisting in the handling
and resolution of homicide cases.
• Handling and resolving of critical incidents including
effective family liaison.
• To advise and make recommendations to the Force through
• Improving the trust and confidence of the community
particularly the diverse communities.
• Any other aspect of an investigation which impacts upon the
community, or any part of the community, including media
3.3 Consideration should be given for the inclusion of other
areas within the Terms of Reference specific to the
4.1 It is recommended Independent Advisors be invited to become
members of an Independent Advisory Group.
4.2 Members should as far as possible be representative of all
aspects of the local community and be able to understand complex
4.3 It is advantageous for members not to have any connection
with the judicial and political process.
4.4 A contract should be drawn up advising new members of their
role and detailing exactly what is expected of them.
5.1 It is recommended training is provided to Independent
Advisors in the following areas:
• Role of the Independent Advisors
• The structure of a major investigation
• The roles of Investigating Officers
• An overview of Holmes
• An overview of Incident Room Procedures and MIRSAP
• Issues regarding CPIA and confidentiality (Criminal Procedures
and Investigations Act
• If connected with a review, the Reviewing Officer's
• Any other area relevant to the investigation or critical
It is recommended training is provided to Independent Advisors
in the following areas:
6.1 It could be argued the impartiality of Independent Advisors
might be jeopardised, by receiving financial reward. However it may
be appropriate to reimburse 'out of pocket' expenses accrued by
individuals performing the role.
6.2 To ensure integrity, accountability, openness and honesty
within this area it is recommended a financial protocol be
6.3 Suggested areas for consideration being:
• Openness and transparency
• Ethics and accountability
• Registering of personal interests
• Professional and effective support for the Advisory
• Best Value
• Nature of payments
• Economic disadvantages of Advisors
• Payment rates
• Payment details
• Additional expenditure
7.1 It is recommended regular briefings should be held to ensure
the Advisors have relevant up-to-date accurate information.
7.2 It is imperative when considering disclosure under Criminal
Proceedings and Investigation Act minutes are recorded of meetings
8.1 The welfare of advisors should be considered particularly
when considering the nature of the investigation or critical
incident they may become involved in.
8.2 Consideration should be given to a risk assessment being
undertaken by Gold Commanders and S.I.O. 's which will include
personal safety and other welfare needs of Independent
8.3 It may be appropriate for a protocol to be put into place to
deal with welfare issues arising from their involvement.
Title: Intelligence Cells for Major Crime
1.1 In recent years Sussex Police has had enshrined in its
general Crime Policy the importance of Intelligence and its
1.2 However, despite the fact that Intelligence Cells had been
set up in the course of major crime investigations the format and
the responsibilities of officers within an Intelligence cell had
been less well defined and as a result there is potential for some
confusion to arise.
1.3 The use of Intelligence in major crime investigations is
well documented and outlined in the Murder Investigation Manual. As
a result, this document should be read in conjunction with the
1.4 Due to the fact that Intelligence Cells within major crime
investigations is a fairly new innovation it is undoubtedly the
case that any policy, at least in the initial stages, will need to
be a fluid concept. Best practise will emanate with experience and
should, therefore, be incorporated into the policy during the
passage of time.
2 CURRENT SET UP
2.1 It is widely known that the current Major Incident Room
(MIR) system within Sussex Police incorporates a H.O.L.M.E.S.
system supervisor and an analyst from the HOLMES unit. It is almost
certainly the case that this set up is unique to Sussex Police and
for this reason there needs to be strict adherence to the policy
that information obtained during the course of a major crime
investigation should all eventually find its way into the MIR.
There is a potential danger if the system is not followed that an
"alternative Incident Room" could develop.
2.2 The fundamental principle therefore should be that all
requests made of the Intelligence Cell should be by way of action
allocated in the normal way from the MIR.
3 THE INTELLIGENCE CELL
3.1 Roles within an Intelligence Cell would normally consist of
2.Local Intelligence Officer (may be more than one dependent
upon the size of the investigation).
3.Divisional Crime Analyst (dependent upon the quantity of
Intelligence work taking place)
3.2 The number of people employed within these roles will depend
on the nature of the investigation and the requirement of the SIO
It may be that the Intelligence aspect of the investigation does
not require the formal setting-up of an Intelligence Cell and on
that basis an Intelligence Liaison Officer (Detective Constable
Local Intelligence Officer - LIO) may be sufficient.
3.3 If a second analyst is required within the Intelligence Cell
great care should be taken that work being carried out by the MIR
analyst is not duplicated. Similarly, the information available to
the analyst within the Intelligence Cell should be shared with the
analyst in the MIR.
3.4 In the event of an Intelligence Cell being set up then the
following officers should comprise the Intelligence Tasking and
1. Deputy SIO
2. Intelligence Manager
3.5 The deputy SIO is responsible for the ongoing supervision
and control of the intelligence cell and sensitive policing issues.
However, the SIO remains in overall control.
3.6 These individuals should meet on a daily basis. The same
officers should also meet on a weekly basis when it is advisable
that the Detective Inspector responsible for the Local Intelligence
Development Unit should be present.
3.7 Past experience has shown that there are some potential
advantages in having the intelligence analyst working in the M.I.R.
with the HOLMES analyst. However, ultimately this is a decision for
3.8 The SIO may wish to consider utilising the Tactical Adviser
from the covert Policing Unit in HQ CID for advice and ultimately
co-ordinating covert policing activity.
4 DEFINITION OF ROLES
4.1 The Intelligence Manager
Whilst this role is not rank specific it will normally be
assumed by a Detective Sergeant either from the Local Divisional
Intelligence Unit or from HQ CID, Operations and Intelligence
Branch. The officer concerned should be experienced in Intelligence
gathering, analysis and dissemination of Intelligence. This officer
will be responsible for the following:
1. Seeking and obtaining from the SIO/deputy SIO a clear
2. Directing the Intelligence Cell to meet such Intelligence
3. Advising the SIO/deputy SIO of all available Intelligence in
an agreed format, in a timely fashion.
4. Effecting the link between the Intelligence Cell and the
5. To be responsible for ensuring the sanitisation of all source
6. The maintenance and dissemination of sensitive policy and
7. The identification and maintenance of observation posts and
issues arising from R. v. JOHNSON and R. v. TURNBULL as they affect
8. Advise SIO/deputy SIO regarding sensitive policing tactics
and options available.
9. Briefing of surveillance teams to ensure accuracy of
intelligence passed to such officers.
4.2 The Intelligence Overseer
This role will normally be undertaken by the local Detective
Inspector responsible for the Divisional Intelligence Development
Unit. This officer will be responsible for:
1. Management advice to the deputy SIO at the Weekly Tasking and
Co-ordinating Group meetings.
2. Review the productivity of the Intelligence Cell against the
3. Providing the link between the Intelligence Cell and the
Registrar of Informants.
4. Reviewing of Sensitive Policy and Intelligence Reports,
focusing in particular on levels of security and Risk Assessment,
further opportunities for Intelligence gathering including
Technical and Disclosure.
5. The direct link from the Intelligence Cell to the Disclosure
Officer providing advice and guidance where appropriate. The
officer should be involved in the preparation of Public Interest
Immunity Hearing reports together with the Disclosure Officer and a
6. Review and disseminate all of the Intelligence gathered
during the course of the investigation at its conclusion in
consultation with the deputy SIO.
5 THE INTELLIGENCE TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING
5.1 The purpose of the daily Tasking and Co-ordinating Group
meetings will be to drive the Intelligence requirements for the
next 24 hours and review new Intelligence from the previous 24
hours. The weekly meeting is held to ensure Intelligence
requirements are aligned to developing lines of investigation. It
is recommended that at this meeting reports should be considered in
relation to Intelligence gathered, a report from the analyst,
review of the current Intelligence requirement and fine-tune as
appropriate, staffing levels within the Intelligence Cell.
5.2 It is the responsibility of the deputy SIO to ensure that
Intelligence Cell activities are in line with SIO policy and do not
operate in isolation from the M.I.R.
6 INTELLIGENCE SECURITY
6.1 To ensure the security of Intelligence assets, controlled
and recorded informant tasking, Intelligence database searches and
co-ordination of response, all Intelligence requirements will be
actioned by the Intelligence Cell. No evidential or enforcement
action should be tasked to the cell by the Tasking and
Co-ordinating Group, nor will they be accepted by the Cell manager.
This principle must also be adhered to by the Action Allocater when
tasking evidence gathering resources.
7 INTELLIGENCE REPORTING/RECORDING
7.1 Intelligence will be reported by way of Intelligence report
C22 (5x5x5), uniquely referenced both to the operation and
sequentially to the report. The original will be brought to the
attention of the Deputy SIO in a timely fashion who will be
required to sign and return the original document to the
intelligence manager. A copy will be provided to the deputy SIO for
his or her information and update of MIR staff as directed by the
SIO. Intelligence recorded on the HOLMES database will be protected
from both inadvertent search and disclosure, and only be accessed
by authorised personnel but will be brought to the attention of the
SIO, Office Enquiry Manager and Disclosure Officer.
8 POLICY RECORDS
8.1 Details of both Intelligence provided and any request for
further tasking should be reported by the deputy SIO in policy
files by reference to the unique reference number only, no specific
detail of Intelligence will be recorded.
8.2 The original reports, signed by the deputy SIO, will be
returned to the Cell manager daily. These reports will be collated
and bound into an Intelligence Report Sensitive file by the
Intelligence manager for submission to the Disclosure Officer on
conclusion of the investigation. These documents should be reviewed
by the Cell overseer on a regular basis at least weekly.
8.3 Copies of the Information Report provided to the deputy SIO
for retention and referral during the operation will be returned to
the Intelligence Cell manager for destruction on conclusion in
consultation with CPS/Counsel.
9 BRIEFING MATERIAL
9.1 It is recognised that Intelligence material may be used
during staff briefings. During the course of these briefings
records will usually be made by staff and must be considered as
disclosable material, the form of such disclosure being subject to
a later consideration.
9.2 The use of Intelligence briefing reports from the
Intelligence Cell are considered to be Best Practice with this in
9.3 Notes should not be made from the report nor copies made by
staff. All such briefing material will be recorded in notes by the
unique reference number only, the report should be returned to the
Intelligence Cell manager on conclusion. The deputy SIO must instil
discipline into this application and will require such reports from
the Intelligence Cell personally as deemed appropriate.
9.4 It may be the case that intelligence gathered during the
course of a major crime investigation may relate to matters outside
of that investigation. In such cases the circulation of such
material and the timing of it will be a matter for the deputy SIO
in consultation with the Intelligence manager.
10.1 The decision to create an Intelligence Cell from major
investigations and determining of its size in terms of personnel
will depend largely on the type of investigation being
Organ Transplant Protocol
1.1 When it has become apparent a patient has suffered an injury
that has caused brain death, the Consultants perform brain death
tests to establish that the brain has died.
1.2 Two Consultants, who should have no connection what so ever
with the Organ Transplant Co-ordination Service, perform two sets
of tests. After the second set of tests when brain death has been
concluded, the patient is certified dead.
1.3 At this point, life support measures are only continued and
the patient only receives artificial ventilation if the next-of-kin
are considering donating organs for the purposes of
1.4 The Intensive Care Doctor will contact HM Coroner at this
point to request permission for organ donation. HM Coroner's will
need to be in possession of all the facts relating to the patient
in order to make a prompt reply for the benefit of the relatives.
Should the Coroner restrict or refuse permission, the Intensive
Care Doctor or Transplant Co-ordinator, will inform the family in
order to minimise the distress they will naturally feel and to
explain the Coroner's decision. The Coroner's Officer will also be
involved with the family at this stage.
1.5 The transplant Co-ordinator can reassure the Coroner that
any necessary tests, examinations, biopsies or reports, be taken
and made of the findings at retrieval of organs if required and a
Forensic Pathologist can be consulted should it be pertinent to the
case. Very often, even when the case has been referred to the
Coroner, organ donation can and does take place, as it is unlikely
to interfere with the evidence.
1.6 In those circumstances where the patient's injuries are
subject of an on going Police enquiry such as a potential homicide
investigation, it is good practice for the Senior Investigating
Officer (SIO) to liaise with HM Coroner in the first instance.
1.7 Where the next of kin are considering donating organs, and
while the tests referred to in paragraph 2 are being undertaken,
the SIO should also contact the Pathologist and give him details of
the patient and of his probable requirement for the Pathologists
1.8 This gives the Pathologist the opportunity to speak with
both HM Coroner and the Hospital Consultant beforehand, and to
establish at an early point whether or not organ donation would
adversely affect or compromise, the evidence to be obtained by post
mortem examination and any subsequent judicial proceedings.
1.9 The essence of this Protocol is early communication between
all agencies, and a clear understanding of HM Coroners
1.10 Sequence of Events
• Consultant HM Coroner
• Consultant Transplant Co-ordinator
Work Related Death Protocol
The first version of this protocol was introduced in 1998, and
was signed by the police, the Health and Safety Executive and the
Crown Prosecution Service. This is the second version, revised to
extend our partnership to include local authorities through their
representative body, the Local Government Association, and the
British Transport Police, and to emphasise further the importance
of working together to investigate thoroughly, and to prosecute
appropriately, those responsible for work-related deaths in England
We were pleased by the level of response to the public
consultation exercises, which produced some excellent and extremely
helpful suggestions. We are acutely conscious of the strength of
public feeling about workplace fatalities, and how these tragic
incidents devastate people's lives.
All five signatory organisations recognise the need for
investigating authorities to talk to each other and to share
information and best practice. We appreciate that people want to be
confident that we are doing all that we can to co-ordinate our
efforts and to co-operate with each other in the best interests of
public safety and of those affected by work-related deaths.
We endorse this revised protocol. We believe that it provides an
enhanced framework for liaison, and that its introduction will help
ensure that all five signatory organisations work in partnership to
deliver the high standard of professionalism that the public
requires and deserves.
This protocol has been agreed between the Health and Safety
Executive (HSE), the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO),
the British Transport Police (BTP), the Local Government
Association and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). It sets out
the principles for effective liaison between the parties in
relation to work-related deaths in England and Wales, and is
available to the public. In particular, it deals with incidents
where, following a death, evidence indicates that a serious
criminal offence other than a health and safety offence may have
been committed. The protocol addresses issues concerning general
liaison and is not intended to cover the operational practices of
the signatory organisations.
HSE, local authorities, the police and the CPS have different
roles and responsibilities in relation to a work-related death.
HSE and local authorities are responsible, under section 18 of
the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSW Act), for making
adequate arrangements for the enforcement of health and safety
legislation with a view to securing the health, safety and welfare
of workers and protecting others, principally the public. Each has
specific areas of responsibility, further details of which are set
out in Annex A of this protocol.
Please note that this protocol does not take into account
co-operation and liaison with the Rail Accident Investigation
Branch (RAIB), which, at the time this protocol was written, had
not come into being. When the RAIB is introduced, it is envisaged
that a separate protocol, or protocols, governing liaison between
the RAIB and the signatory organisations will be developed.
There are other enforcing authorities that have responsibility
for enforcing health and safety, or other similar legislation. Some
of these are listed in Annex A. The Civil Aviation Authority and
the Maritime and Coastguard Agency are not signatories to this
protocol, but each has agreed to abide by the protocol's
At present, only the police can investigate serious criminal
offences (other than health and safety offences) such as
manslaughter, and only the CPS can decide whether such a case will
proceed. The police will also have an interest in establishing the
circumstances surrounding a work-related death in order to assist
the coroner's inquest.
Health and safety offences are usually prosecuted by HSE, the
local authority or other enforcing authority in accordance with
current enforcement policy. The CPS may also prosecute health and
safety offences, but usually does so only when prosecuting other
serious criminal offences, such as manslaughter, arising out of the
When making a decision whether to prosecute, the CPS, HSE, the
local authority or other enforcing authority will review the
evidence according to the Code for Crown Prosecutors to decide if
there is a realistic prospect of conviction and, if so, whether a
prosecution is needed in the public interest. Local authorities
that have signed up to the Enforcement Concordat must follow the
principles and procedures within it.
The underlying principles of this protocol are as follows:
An appropriate decision concerning prosecution will be made•
based on a sound investigation of the circumstances surrounding
The police will conduct an investigation where there is an•
indication of the commission of a serious criminal offence (other
than a health and safety offence), and HSE, the local authority or
other enforcing authority will investigate health and safety
offences. There will usually be a joint investigation, but on the
rare occasions where this would not be appropriate, there will
still be liaison and co-operation between the investigating
The decision to prosecute will be co-ordinated, and made without
The bereaved and witnesses will be kept suitably informed;
The parties to the protocol will maintain effective mechanisms
1.2 IN WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL THIS PROTOCOL
For the purposes of this protocol, a work-related death is a
fatality resulting from an incident arising out of, or in
connection with, work. The principles set out in this protocol also
apply to cases where the victim suffers injuries in such an
incident that are so serious that there is a clear indication,
according to medical opinion, of a strong likelihood of death.
There will be cases in which it is difficult to determine
whether a death is work-related within the application of this
protocol; for example, those arising out of some road traffic
incidents, or in prisons or health care institutions, or following
a gas leak. Each fatality must be considered individually, on its
particular facts, according to organisational internal guidance,
and a decision made as to whether it should be classed as a
work-related death. In determining the question, the enforcing
authorities will hold discussions and agree upon a conclusion
1.3 STATEMENT OF INTENT
In the early stages of an investigation, whether any serious
criminal offence has been committed is not always apparent. The
parties to the protocol are committed to ensuring that any
investigation into a work-related death is thorough and
appropriate, and agree to work closely together in order to achieve
this. Decisions in relation to who will lead the investigation, and
the direction it will take, should be timely, informed by the best
available evidence and technical expertise, and should take account
of the wider public interest. Should there be any issue as to who
is to be involved in investigating any work-related death, then the
parties will work together to reach a conclusion.
2 INITIAL ACTION
2.1 a police officer attending an incident involving a
work-related death should arrange, according to the officer's own
force procedures governing unexplained deaths, to:
• Identify, secure, preserve and take control of the scene,
and any other relevant place;
• Supervise and record all activity;
• Inform a senior supervisory officer
• Enquire whether the employer or other responsible person
in control of the premises or activity has informed HSE, the local
authority or other investigating or enforcing authority; and
•Contact and discuss the incident with HSE, the local authority
or other enforcing authority, and agree arrangements for
controlling the scene, for considering access to others, and for
other local handling procedures to ensure the safety of the
2.2 A police officer of supervisory rank should attend the scene
and any other relevant place to assess the situation, review
actions taken to date and assume responsibility for the
investigation. Should any other investigating or enforcing
authority have staff in attendance before the police arrive, it
should ensure that the police have been called, and preserve the
scene in accordance with the initial actions (above) until the
police get there.
3 MANAGEMENT OF THE INVESTIGATION
3.1 Investigations should always be managed professionally, with
communications between the signatory organisations continually
maintained. Investigations should generally be jointly conducted,
with one of the parties taking the lead, or primacy, as
appropriate. An investigation may also require liaison with any
other enforcing authority that may have an interest, and may
include liaison with the CPS.
3.2 Throughout the period of the investigation, the police and
HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority should keep
the progress of the investigation under review. Milestones should
be agreed and monitored, and policy and key decisions recorded.
3.3 The police, HSE, the local authority or other enforcing
authority should agree upon:
• How resources are to be specifically used;
• How evidence is to be disclosed between the parties;
• How the interviewing of witnesses, the instruction of
experts and the forensic examinations of exhibits is to be
• How, and to what extent, corporate or organisational
failures should be investigated;
• A strategy for keeping the bereaved, witnesses and other
interested parties such as the coroner, informed of developments in
the investigation; and
• A media strategy, to take account of the sensitivities of
the bereaved and those involved in the incident, and to encourage
consistency of approach in reporting.
3.4 In certain large-scale investigations it may be beneficial
to form a strategic liaison group to ensure effective
inter-organisational communication, and to share relevant
information and experiences.
4 DECISION MAKING
4.1 Where the investigation gives rise to a suspicion that a
serious criminal offence (other than a health and safety offence)
may have caused the death, the police will assume primacy for the
investigation and will work in partnership with HSE, the local
authority or other enforcing authority.
4.2 Where it becomes apparent during the investigation that
there is insufficient evidence that a serious criminal offence
(other that a health and safety offence) caused the death, the
investigation should, by agreement, be taken over by HSE, the local
authority or other enforcing authority. Both parties should record
such a decision in writing.
4.3 Where HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority
is investigating the death, and new information is discovered which
may assist the police in considering whether a serious criminal
offence (other than a health and safety offence) has been
committed, then the enforcing authority will pass that new
information to the police. An enforcing authority inspector may do
this, but it may also be from the enforcing authority's solicitors
via the CPS. The police should then consider whether to resume
primacy for the investigation. The decision and reasons should be
recorded in writing.
4.4 There will also be rare occasions where as a result of the
coroner's inquest, judicial review or other legal proceedings,
further consideration of the evidence and surrounding facts may
need to be made. Where this takes place the police, the enforcing
authority with primacy for the investigation and the CPS will work
in partnership to ensure an early decision. There may also be a
need for further investigation.
5 DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL
5.1 Disclosure must always follow the established law and
5.2 Where there has been an investigation, any material obtained
should be shared, subject to any legal restrictions, between the
police, HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority and
the CPS. Special handling procedures may be necessary in certain
cases. The organisation responsible for retaining the exhibits,
documents and other relevant material should also be agreed
6 SPECIAL INQUIRIES
6.1 In the case of some incidents, particularly those involving
multiple fatalities, the Health and Safety Commission may, with the
consent of the Secretary of State, direct that a public inquiry be
held. Alternatively, the Commission may authorise HSE, or any other
person, to investigate and produce a special report.
6.2 In such circumstances, the police will provide any necessary
support and evidence to the person appointed to conduct the public
enquiry, or to the special investigation, subject to the relevant
6.3 Complex legal issues may arise when there are parallel
public inquiries and criminal investigations or prosecutions. The
signatories will aim to keep inquiry chairs informed of the
progress of the investigation.
6.4 Sometimes the report of a public inquiry may be delayed to
await the conclusion of criminal proceedings, and on other
occasions, there may be no such delay because of strong public
interest in publishing the report and the recommendations of a
public inquiry quickly. In either event, the signatories to the
protocol will work together to ensure that the decision to
prosecute is made as expeditiously as possible and any criminal
proceedings commenced without delay.
7 ADVICE PRIOR TO CHARGE
7.1 Early liaison by the police, HSE, the local authority or
other enforcing authority with the CPS, is to be encouraged in the
best interests of the investigation and prosecution process as a
whole. There is no need to wait until a file is ready to be
submitted before the police open discussions with the CPS. The
police are encouraged, at any stage following a work-related death,
to consult the CPS for advice, not only about the nature of any
charges, but also as to the legal and evidential issues surrounding
the investigation, including advice about expert evidence.
7.2 The police should seek the advice of the CPS before charging
an individual with any serious criminal offence (other than a
health and safety offence) arising out of a work-related death.
7.3 The police must consult the CPS Casework Directorate for
advice when there is any consideration of charging a company or
corporation with any serious criminal offence (other than a health
or safety offence).
8 THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE
8.1 The decision to prosecute any serious criminal offence
(other than a health and safety offence) arising out of the death
will be taken by the CPS according to The code for crown
prosecutors. Such an offence may be prosecuted either with or
without related health and safety offences. The decision will be
made following discussion with the police, and, where appropriate,
HSE the local authority or other enforcing authority.
8.2 There should be no undue delay in reaching the prosecution
decision. If there is a delay, then the CPS will notify the police
and the enforcing authority and explain the reasons for the delay,
and will keep them informed of the progress of the decision
8.3 The CPS should always take into account the consequences for
the bereaved of the decision whether or not to prosecute, and of
any views expressed by them.
8.4 When the CPS has made its decision, it must be communicated
to the police, HSE, the local authority or other enforcing
authority as soon as practicable, so that HSE, the local authority
or other enforcing authority can decide as expeditiously as
possible whether to prosecute for health and safety offences if the
CPS is not doing so.
8.5 Where HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority
has primacy for the investigation, then the decision whether to
prosecute for health and safety offences will be taken without
undue delay. The relevant enforcing authority should then inform
the police of its decision.
8.6 No prosecution decision will be made public until the
bereaved, the Coroner's Office and any potential defendants have
been notified according to the previously agreed strategy.
8.7 The public announcement of the decision will be made
according to the agreed media strategy.
8.8 Where there is to be no CPS prosecution, the announcement of
the CPS's decision shall include the fact that the decision of HSE,
the local authority or other enforcing authority will be made after
the inquest (subject to paragraph 10.3, below). It is CPS policy to
set out its reasons in writing and send them to the bereaved, and
to offer to meet them to discuss the reasons for reaching the
9 THE PROSECUTION
9.1 Where the CPS and HSE, the local authority or another
enforcing authority seek to prosecute offences arising out of the
same incident, the prosecution(s) shall be initiated and managed
9.2 There should be an early conference attended by the CPS, the
police and HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority to
consider the management of the proceedings. In particular, the
following issues should be discussed, agreed and recorded:
• Who will take lead responsibility for the
• The nature and the wording of the charges (including,
where appropriate, consideration of any alternative charges and
Arrangements for the retention and disclosure of
• A case management timetable;
• Arrangements for keeping the bereaved and witnesses
• The announcement of the decision;
• Arrangements for maintaining contact during the
prosecution, and an agreement as to a mechanism for consulting,
should an issue arise which results in the discontinuance of the
proceedings or no evidence being offered;
• An agreement as to any specific instructions to the
prosecuting advocate; and
• Any other case management issues.
9.3 Where the CPS is prosecuting, and there is no prosecution by
HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority, but an
enforcing authority wishes to retain an interest in the case, the
CPS will keep that enforcing authority informed of the progress and
outcome of the case.
10 HM Coroner
10.1 The police or the CPS will notify the coroner when a
serious criminal offence arising out of a work-related death (other
than a health and safety offence) has been charged. The coroner may
then adjourn the inquest until the end of the criminal prosecution.
The Director of Public Prosecutions may also ask the coroner to
adjourn the inquest where there are certain proceedings before a
magistrates' court that are related to a death.
10.2 Where the CPS is prosecuting, and HSE, the local authority
or other enforcing authority has submitted documents or a report to
the coroner about a work-related death, the CPS and the police
shall also be given a copy. Similarly, where an enforcing authority
is prosecuting, and the police or CPS has submitted documents or a
report to the coroner about a work-related death, the enforcing
authority shall also be given a copy. In all cases, documents or
reports may not be disclosed to any party without the consent of
the party that originally submitted them.
10.3 Where the CPS has reviewed the case and decided not to
prosecute, HSE, the local authority or other enforcing authority
will await the result of the coroner's inquest before charging any
health and safety offences, unless to wait would prejudice the
case. Where, following an inquest, public inquiry, judicial review
or other legal proceedings, it is necessary for the CPS to review
or re-review the case, HSE, the local authority or other enforcing
authority will wait until the review by the CPS has been completed
before instigating or continuing its own proceedings.
11 NATIONAL LIAISON
11.1 The National Liaison Committee comprises representatives
from the police, BTP, the CPS, HSE and the Local Government
Association. It will meet at least twice a year to review the
operation of the protocol and consider the need for changes to the
12 LOCAL LIAISON
12.1 The Regional Liaison Committees comprise representatives
from the signatories, nominated at local levels. These committees
will meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of mutual interest
and concern, and in particular, the operation of the protocol from
a local standpoint, to monitor the protocol's effectiveness, and to
communicate any issues to the National Liaison Committee.
12.2 The Regional Liaison Committees will be responsible for
ensuring that there is an identified and effective line of local
communication between the five organisations.
ANNEX A: A GENERAL GUIDE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE HEALTH
AND SAFETY AT WORK ETC ACT 1974 (HSW ACT) AND RELATED
Enforcement of the HSW Act and the related legislation is
generally shared between HSE and local authorities. A general guide
to the allocation of the main activity is detailed below. For more
detailed guidance on allocation of specific activities or premises
refer to HSE's Website: www.hse.gov.uk/lau/lacs/23-15.htm.
HSE is responsible for enforcing work-related health and safety
• Factories and other manufacturing premises, including
motor vehicle repair
• Chemical plants and refineries
• Railways, tram and underground systems
• Mines, quarries and landfill sites
• Farms, agriculture and forestry
• Hospitals, including nursing homes
• Local government, including their offices and facilities
run by them
• Schools, colleges and universities
• Domestic gas installation, maintenance or repair
• Utilities, including power generation, water, and
• Fairgrounds (travelling or fixed)
• Airports (except terminal buildings, car parks and office
• Police and fire authorities; Crown bodies, including the
Ministry of Defence
• Nuclear installations
• Offshore gas and oil installations and associated
activities, including pipe-laying barges, and diving support
• Onshore major hazards, including pipelines, gas
transmission and distribution
• Transport of dangerous goods by road and rail
• Manufacture, transport, handling and security of
• Common parts of domestic premises.
In England and Wales, local authorities enforce the HSW Act in
respect of certain non-domestic premises, including:
• Shops and retailing, including market stalls,
coin-operated launderettes, and mobile vendors
• Most office-based activities
• Some wholesale and retail warehouses
• Hotels, guest houses, hostels, caravan and camping sites,
restaurants, public houses and other licensed premises
• Leisure and entertainment, including night clubs,
cinemas, social clubs, circuses, sports facilities, health clubs,
gyms, riding schools, racecourses, pleasure boat hire, motor-racing
circuits, museums, theatres, art galleries and exhibition
• Places of worship and undertakers
• Animal care, including zoos, livery stables and
• Therapeutic and beauty services, including massage,
saunas, solariums, tattooing, skin and body piercing, and
• Residential care homes
• Privately run pre-school child care, e.g. nurseries.
There are other authorities and agencies with responsibilities for
the investigation and enforcement of the HSW Act and other similar
legislation. These include, for example:
• The Fire Authorities
• The Maritime & Coastguard Agency (on board ships)
• The Care Standards Commission (health care premises)
• The Environment Agency
• The Civil Aviation Authority
• Trading Standards
• The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
• The Marine Accident Investigation Branch
Contacting HSE out of hours
HSE is not an emergency service. It has produced guidance for
police and other emergency service control rooms describing how to
contact HSE inspectors out of hours.
Contacting local authorities out of hours
There will be local arrangements in place for contacting the
authorised health and safety inspectors within local authorities.
Contact can usually be made through the local town hall or council
offices during office hours and on an emergency number out of
The National Liaison Committee is extremely grateful to those
people and organisations that responded to the public consultation
exercises. Their contributions were invaluable to the revision
process, and , as a result, many of the ideas and proposals have
now been included in this protocol.
More information can be found in these free publications:
Advice and information for bereaved families (England and Wales)
(available from HSE inspectors, not HSE Books)
Advice and information for bereaved families (Scotland) MISC200
(available from HSE Inspectors, not HSE Books)
Enforcement policy statement HSC15 HSE Books 2002
Health and safety in local authority enforced sectors. Section
18: HSC guidance to local authorities MISC488 HSE Books 2002
The code for crown prosecutors Crown Prosecution Service,
Communications Branch, 50 Ludgate Hill, London EC4M 7EX, Tel: 020
7796 8442, Website: www.cps.gov.uk